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LIGHTING THE FEMALE FUSE: GROUP FUSION, DEVOTED ACTORS, AND 
FEMALE SUICIDE BOMBERS 
 
KAYLA BONNIN 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
This thesis intends to revise and update devoted actor theory (DAT) by 
introducing a neglected dataset—female suicide bombers. DAT provides one such 
theoretical framework for understanding extremist group behavior and, to a lesser extent, 
suicidal bombing. DAT is largely satisfying: its claims and conclusions address relevant 
issues and provide compelling answers to critical questions. However, it is not without its 
analytical and empirical gaps. Crucially, DAT does not explicitly account for the 
narratives and characteristic motives of female suicide bombers—which often differ in 
logic, content, and tone from those of their male counterparts.  
In addition, DAT assumes that people who are fused with extreme groups are 
willing to self-sacrifice for their group, but the theory does not account for how this 
fusion process transpires. Therefore, I propose two amendments to DAT that not only 
address theoretical issues, which arise partially from the lack of female terrorist accounts, 
but also creates a narrative that bridges the gap that would explain how an individual 
progresses from bonding to a group to making the decision to die for it. Accordingly, I 
also propose to theorize a psychosocial process that links the way in which individuals, 
specifically females, become fused to a group and edge closer to the most extreme of 
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extremist decisions: to annihilate their bodies and selves, while at the same time 
annihilating or wreaking havoc upon the lives of others whom they have deemed enemies 
of themselves or their group. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Suicide bombers are statistically rare among terrorist groups. Female suicide 
bombers (FSBs) constitute only a fraction of this subset. That is, only a small percentage 
of the human population are willing to strap a bomb to themselves and detonate in a 
public place on behalf of a cause. But, despite the small number of people who perpetrate 
these violent acts, there has been no shortage of theories in academia attempting to 
explain the social, political, cultural, religious, and psychological causes and motivations 
of extremist behavior in general and suicide bombing in particular. These theories 
address, with varying degrees of success, the question of why some individuals develop 
an extreme willingness to sacrifice themselves for a group they feel loyalty to, or for a 
social or political cause they support. With concepts rooted in cognitive anthropology and 
social psychology, devoted actor theory (DAT) provides one such theoretical framework 
for understanding extremist group behavior and, to a lesser extent, suicidal bombing. This 
thesis intends to revise and update DAT by introducing a neglected dataset—female 
suicide bombers. 
DAT is largely satisfying: its claims and conclusions address relevant issues and 
provide compelling answers to critical questions. However, it is not without its analytical 
and empirical gaps. Crucially, DAT does not explicitly account for the narratives and 
characteristic motives of female suicide bombers—which often differ in logic, content, 
and tone from those of their male counterparts. By ignoring this small but nontrivial 
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element of the extremist population, DAT provides at best an incomplete explanation of 
the phenomena it claims to study.  
In addition, DAT assumes that people who are fused1 with extreme groups are 
willing to self-sacrifice for their group, but the theory does not account for how this 
fusion process transpires. Further, not all devoted actors make this extreme sacrifice to 
die for their group. Therefore, I propose two amendments to DAT that not only address 
theoretical issues that stem implicitly from the lack of female terrorist accounts, but also 
creates a narrative that bridges the gap that would explain how an individual progresses 
from bonding to a group to making the decision to die for it. Accordingly, I also propose 
a psychosocial process that links the way in which individuals, specifically females, 
become fused to a group and edge closer to the most extreme of extremist decisions: to 
annihilate their bodies and selves, while at the same time annihilating or wreaking havoc 
upon the lives of others whom they have deemed enemies of themselves or their group. 
This amendment also adds valuable perspective by introducing data collected 
about female suicide bombers—a overlooked dataset in the current DAT literature. The 
extant research on suicide bombers suggests that the causal pathway to self-sacrifice for 
females may be markedly different and more personal than for males. Ultimately, two 
political, socio-cultural, and psychological pathways to suicide bombing for females will 
be introduced as Pathway I and Pathway II of this paper, and thus will create two 
different amendments to DAT. 
                                               
1 This term is being used in a technical sense from the identity fusion literature and is discussed in a later 
section. 
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In Pathway I, the focus is on the more typical female pathway to suicide bombing 
that appear to be most common in case studies. Durkheim’s fatalist and acute altruistic 
suicide concepts will be utilized to derive a new premise that better explains these more 
typical patterns seen in female suicide bombers across cultures. In short, women—
particularly those who grow up in or have close affiliations with war-torn or 
catastrophically destabilized geopolitical hot zones—are likely to fuse with one or more 
of their “extended communities”: be it political, religious, nationalistic, or cultural in 
nature. Stigmatizing traumatic experiences lead to fatalistic suicidal ideations, which in 
turn bring about acute altruistic suicidal tendencies. Finally, the female connects with the 
extended social group to which they are already fused to carry out the sacrifice for the 
group’s social or political cause that is ultimately self-serving as well.  
In Pathway II, a richer explanatory narrative is introduced that explores the 
complexity and interconnectivity of the motivating factors, outside of the typical, yet still 
complex, motives seen in case studies that drive females to commit a suicide attack. 
Historically traumatic and thus significant life events that manifest into motivations 
create a network connecting other complex motivations, which can build upon each other 
and overwhelm individuals (male or female) with severe psychosocial strain. Women—
particularly those entrenched in more traditional, religiously conservative, or otherwise 
rigidly patriarchal cultures—are additionally burdened by special sets of restrictions and 
stresses. This can further aggravate already dire or extreme situations, increasing the 
possibility a woman could turn to self-annihilation (and the simultaneous killing of 
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others) as the “right” answer to her social and political commitments and/or her 
psychological state of mind. 
The majority of female suicide bombings have occurred in Iraq, Sri Lanka, 
Russia, Israel, and Palestine. Therefore, I focus my inquiry on suicide attacks that 
occurred or originated in these geopolitical regions.2 3 Case studies, datasets, and 
literature reviews come from two large databases and research from multiple disciplines: 
• Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism (CPOST) Suicide Attack Database, 
University of Chicago 
• National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 
(START), University of Maryland 
• Terrorism studies  
• Cognitive anthropology 
• Cognitive science of religion  
 
• Psychology 
• Evolutionary psychology  
 
 
                                               
2 This project focuses on “willful” actors who were neither imprisoned nor otherwise physically coerced 
(so far as the evidence shows) before perpetrating attacks. In other words, for instance, I do not consider the 
female suicide bombers in Boko Haram, many of whom were likely kidnapped and forced by their captors 
to commit attacks against their will. To wit, Hilary Maftess, who co-authored a 2017 report out of Yale and 
West Point on Boko Harum suicide attacks, indicated to CNN that “as well as true suicide bombers, who 
are willing to die for a cause, Boko Haram also uses improvised explosives carried by unwilling victims 
and others coerced verbally, physically, materially or by violence. These are known as person-borne IEDs, 
or PBIEDs. ‘Children and those forced into serving as bombers cannot be considered “suicide bombers” 
and the counterterrorism measures against PBIED attacks can differ than the tactics deployed against an 
autonomous, dedicated suicide bomber’” (Robyn Kriel, “Boko Haram favors women, children as suicide 
bombers, study reveals,” CNN Online, August 11, 2017). 
3 My datasets stop at 2016, so more recent events including female suicide bombers are not reviewed. 
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DEVOTED ACTOR THEORY: 
A FRAMEWORK FOR SUICIDAL SELF-SACRIFICE 
Devoted actor theory (DAT) is one of the most compelling psycho-social 
explanations of how and why extremist groups form and generate self-sacrificing actors. 
Developed by leading scholars at Artis International—a multi-disciplinary think tank that 
studies political violence using the social and behavioral sciences—DAT combines two 
previously developed concepts derived from research in the psychology of religion, 
identify, and group behavior: 1) identity fusion and 2) sacred values. Essentially, the 
theory asserts that group-identity “fusion” and commitment to “sacred” values can merge 
together and thus create an environment in which an individual—the devoted actor— 
becomes increasingly willing to die for the perceived advancement of their group.  
A primary architect of the theory, Atran (2016) poses the “devoted actor 
framework” as a conceptual tool “to better understand the social and psychological 
mechanisms underlying people’s willingness to make costly sacrifices for a group and a 
cause” (p. 192). He elaborates: 
Our research indicates that when people act as “devoted actors” they are 
deontic (i.e., duty-based) agents who mobilize for collective action to protect 
cherished values in ways that are dissociated from likely risks or rewards. 
Devoted actors represent a dimension of thought and behavior distinct from 
instrumental rationality in resisting material compromises over such values. The 
devoted actor hypothesis is defined as follows: 
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People will become willing to protect morally important or sacred values 
through costly sacrifice and extreme actions, even being willing to kill and 
die, particularly when such values are embedded in or fused with group 
identity, becoming intrinsic to “Who I am” and “Who We are.” (Atran and 
Ginges, 2015) 
[…]  
The devoted actor framework integrates two hitherto independent research 
programs in cognitive theory, sacred values and “identity fusion, while drawing 
on key insights from sociological (Durkheim 2012 [1912]; Weber 1963) and 
anthropological (Turner 1969; Rappaport 1971, 1999) analyses of religion and 
community. Sacred values are nonnegotiable preferences whose defense compels 
actions beyond evident reason, that is, regardless of calculable costs and 
consequences (Ginges et al., 2007). Identity fusion occurs when personal and 
group identities collapse into a unique identity to generate a collective sense of 
invincibility and special destiny (Swann et al., 2012). These two programs 
account for different aspects of intractable intergroup conflicts; however, […] we 
argue that sacred values and identity fusion interact to produce willingness to 
make costly sacrifices for a primary reference group even unto death, that is, 
sacrificing the totality of self-interests. (Atran, 2016, p. 192–3) 
The two psychosocial, morally charged mechanisms at work in devoted actors—sacred 
values and identify fusion—are discussed in greater length below. 
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Identity Fusion 
 
The first conceptual pillar of DAT is identity fusion: the idea that the social-self 
and personal-self work in tandem to create an individual’s identity. This concept 
challenged previous notions of social identity in extremist groups. For instance, social 
identity theory held that when one’s social-self is elicited, the social-self becomes 
dominant over the personal-self, and therefore the social traits would be superior and 
govern an actor’s behavior; conversely, when one’s personal-self is elicited, personal 
qualities and uniqueness are stressed, as the social-self is suppressed (Tajfel & Turner, 
1979). Identity fusion theory, on the other hand, proposes that, in some individuals 
(referred to as “fused” individuals), the personal-self and social-self work in harmony and 
do not diminish each other’s strengths. Swann et al. (2012) expound, “Identity fusion is a 
relatively unexplored form of alignment with groups that entails a visceral feeling of 
oneness with the group” that can create extreme group alignment (p. 441). Therefore, 
instead of social beliefs prevailing over personal beliefs, as suggested in social identity 
theory, a “powerful union” is created and the fused identity draws from both social and 
personal thought, further cementing the feelings of oneness in the group (Gomez et al., 
2011; Swann et al., 2014). Subsequently, the individual views the group as an inseparable 
part of themselves. It is then, argues Sheikh et al. (2014), that self-identity becomes fused 
with a unique collective identity.  
Furthermore, fused individuals have more permeable boundaries between the 
personal-self and social-self, allowing them to be more fluid and thus creating a more 
formidable bond. It follows then that fused individuals view the group as an extension of 
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one’s self and will also foster stronger relationships within the group, thereby creating a 
sense of obligation to support and defend other members—an obligation which can be 
equally if not more powerful than any desire to defend one’s self; a fused individual, 
feeling transcendent of self and enlarged by their group, can become a catalyst for 
extreme behavior and self-sacrifice, sometimes total sacrifice (Gomez et al., 2011; Swann 
et al., 2012; Swann et al., 2014). Nonetheless, according to Jong et al. (2015), “While 
there is increasing evidence for the role of identity fusion in intergroup behavior, its 
causes are still relatively unknown” (p. 2). Despite current scientific uncertainties about 
how exactly this identify-fusion process unfolds in a person’s mind, body, and culture, in 
a later section I introduce a concept from political psychology (political socialization) 
that stands as a potential candidate for better explaining some of the casual factors of 
identity fusion. 
Fusion theory is itself divided into two types or categories of identity merging: 
local fusion and extended fusion. These are discussed below. 
Local Fusion 
Local fusion relates to a connection to others with whom the individual has direct 
relational ties, and the bond is created through shared experiences within these close-knit 
groups or individuals. Significant to the topic at hand (suicide attacks), Swann et al. 
(2012) emphasize that when these shared experiences are “challenging or traumatic rather 
than positive,” they foster an even deeper attachment to the trusted confederates of their 
in-group (p. 449). Here it is worth noting that many would-be terrorists join their groups 
with friends—due to the local fusion they already share—and then continue to fuse with 
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other members of the newly joined group, creating a kinship-like bond (Atran & Ginges 
2012; Swann et al., 2012; Victoroff, 2005). These bonds become as strong, or in some 
cases, stronger than bonds with their own families. In their research on fused fighters in 
the 2011 Libyan Revolution for instance, Whitehouse et al. (2014) claim, “When 
ordinary citizens band together and do battle, their connections to one another take on 
familial—or even suprafamilial—qualities” (p. 17784).  
By the raw logic of evolution—which assumes that the ultimate biological drive 
of any life form, humans included, is to survive in order to propagate—the willingness to 
sacrifice one’s self for a group can appear be evolutionarily counterintuitive. But digging 
deeper, the picture is much more complicated, as group action, personal sacrifice, and 
altruism can play real parts in propagating genes if not bodies into the future. For humans 
living in smaller tribes of kinship, it clearly made sense to sacrifice oneself for the group 
because of the familial relations (propping up the genes of your kin means you are 
propping up many of your own genes). But this group adhesion and commitment in the 
hyper-social human animal extends far beyond just family relations. Fused groups can 
spur feats of great cooperation, as well as great competition between in-groups and out-
groups. And that includes warfare, even genocide. Atran (2010) explains, “If losing the 
war results in genocide, you’re dead anyway; so better to fight with your all to the end to 
give yourself and your group a chance” (p. 297). Locally fused individuals , who directly 
interact with their adopted “brothers” and “sisters” in their “motherland/fatherland,” often 
see no difference between dying for their actual kin and dying for any member of the 
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larger group with whom they are fused. If they perceive death—their own or killing out-
group members—best serves the group and its “sacred” causes, then death it is. 
Extended Fusion  
Local fusion falls short in explaining an individual’s willingness to die for 
more“large-scale” or expanded groups or for “abstract causes” (Gomez &Vazquez, 
2015). Extended fusion is basically a projection of those same relational ties found in 
local fusion, but the ties are extended to larger and more abstract groups—religious, 
national, cultural, or ethnic—where individuals often have little or no direct contact with 
the other members of the group. Perhaps the most relevant and compelling example of 
extended fusion at work today would be Islamic State extremists who get recruited 
through the internet from widely dispersed geographic and national regions (see, e.g., 
Whitehouse, in press). 
The notion of fictive kinship—again, the “brothers” and “sisters” of the 
“mother/fatherland” but now extended to total strangers and more abstracted ideas and 
objects—allows us to better understand how an individual can become highly fused with 
an extended group with no familial ties, or rather, a “commitment to a social category” 
(Whitehouse, in press). Under these circumstances, argue Swann and Buhrmester (2015), 
“this projection process could persuade highly fused persons to sacrifice themselves for 
members of a heterogeneous group” (p. 55). Additionally, these relationships can be 
more “metaphorical than literal” and could account for the “lone wolf” terrorists acting 
on behalf of larger terrorist groups (Gomez et al., 2011; Stern, 2003; Swann et al., 2012, 
2014). The manner in which an individual becomes bonded to these expanded but tight-
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knit groups is not fully understood. But it seems safe to say that shared intense emotional 
experiences are a common factor: those emotive experiences can be generated by a 
political conflict, collective trauma, or shared sacred values; and importantly these 
emotions can now be triggered and shared across long distances in very short timespans 
thanks to today’s powerful media technologies (Jong et al., 2015; Whitehouse, in press).  
Some scholars suggest that fusing with non-kin groups could actually be a 
cognitive misfire or a byproduct of other survival mechanisms that project “imagined 
kin” onto larger groups (Atran & Ginges, 2012; Liddle & Shackleford, 2014; Swann et 
al., 2012). Misfire or not, extended fusion seems here to stay and we are left to grapple 
with its powerful (sometimes deadly) consequences. 
 
Sacred Values  
The second pillar of DAT, sacred values theory, derives from psychological 
studies in the mid-90s (esp. Tetlock & Baron) whose findings opposed rational choice 
theory that dominated human decision science, economics, and game theory for many 
years. While the term “sacred” typically evokes religious images/meanings, sacred values 
do not necessarily indicate religious belief. Rather, they can also refer to objects, beliefs, 
or practices that are viewed as absolute and non-negotiable within a community or group 
(Atran, 2016). Sacred values are composed of moral, cultural, or political beliefs, and 
“mundane values may be sacralized through rituals linking them to nonreligious sacred 
values, like the nation,” which can facilitate both large-scale cooperation and enduring 
group conflict (Atran & Ginges, 2012, p. 857).  
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To demonstrate, the recent controversy in the National Football League (US) is an 
example of the effect of sacred non-religious values whereby hundreds of players 
protested police brutality and racial inequality by kneeling during the national anthem 
before a game. Many people with apparently deep emotional bonds to the country 
believed that by not standing during the nation’s anthem, the football players were 
disparaging the country, or blaspheming the people’s collective sacred values regarding 
their allegiance to the nation. But, while sharing sacred values can be as benign as a 
collective admiration for one’s country, it can also lead to more volatile connections. As 
Atran (2016) explains, “larger groups that are sacralized (in terms of territory, cultural 
history, language, etc.) can be the primary locus of identity fusion and of the interaction 
between identity fusion and sacred values in producing costly sacrifices, including 
fighting and dying” (p. 200). Furthermore, this is not unlike the reasons many Americans 
join the armed forces: to fight for what their flag stands for, for American sacred values. 
While such self-defining experiences can indeed be positive or negative, there seems to 
be a unique role for negative experiences, in terms of explaining the path, for some, to 
terrorism and more specifically, suicide bombings.  
While DAT provides valuable insights into extremist group behavior, it is not as 
comprehensive as it could be. The remainder of this paper serves as an illustration of 
some of its empirical and theoretical oversights. 
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FEMALE SUICIDE BOMBERS: AN INTRODUCTION 
 
 
A reflexive assumption in the American/Western popular imagination—often fed 
by headlines and oversimplified stories in today’s mainstream media—is that anyone, 
women in particular, who violently commits suicide in order to murder others must be 
diabolical, emotionless, and monstrous. What else could lead them to commit these 
horrific crimes? What’s more, society often seems more repulsed by violent women than 
by violent men—possibly they are frightened of the unknown, of what they do not 
understand, of the anomalies (MacDonald, 1992). Yet, despite what is often presented in 
the media, female terrorists—including suicide bombers—are not monstrous 
psychopaths. Indeed, the most chilling thing about them perhaps is their apparent, for 
lack of a better term, normalcy. They blend in the crowd just like everyone else.  
 
Overview  
 
According to the statistics from the University of Chicago’s Project on Security 
and Terrorism Suicide Attack Database (CPOST) (2016), FSBs are a proportionately 
small, yet not insignificant, minority of the overall number of suicide bombers, who are 
heavily outnumbered by terrorists in general. But what might motivate this modest 
number of women who decide not only to commit murder, but also to destroy themselves 
in the process? Empirical data are limited, pieced together through scholars’ and 
journalists’ interviews of those people who knew these women and interviews of those 
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women who tried and failed (Lester et al., 2004). Accordingly, the data that have been 
collected reveal a wide range of motivating factors. There have been multi-disciplinary 
approaches to understanding and explaining suicide terrorism and many theories 
proposed to make sense of an act that is incomprehensible to most people. Scholars in 
such fields as terrorism studies, international relations, religious studies, psychology, 
sociology, and feminist studies are producing valuable work on the subject of female 
suicide bombers, but this research pales in comparison to that devoted to male suicide 
bombers. Considering that women constitute only 15 percent of the total number of 
suicide bombers, this comparative lack of research may at first seem justifiable. But 
theories and research based exclusively on data on male suicide bombers cannot provide 
a complete representation of this phenomenon. 
Journalist Eileen MacDonald (1992) made a compelling case as to why she 
studies female terrorists: “In attempting to understand first and judge second, one runs the 
risk of being accused of harboring sympathies for terrorists; but perhaps it is better to be 
accused of that than to cower in terror at a false image of a monster that does not exist” 
(p. xiii). Similarly, this paper does not wish to undermine the brutality of their actions, 
but rather attempts to explain them.  
 
Definitions  
 
Before delving into the discussion of FSBs, it is necessary to define some 
commonly used terms. Definitions of suicide bombers often vary, and many terms and 
phrases are used interchangeably. Suicide terrorism, suicide attacks, suicide missions, 
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suicide bombers, and martyrdom operations are all terms used to identify and categorize 
these horrific acts. Some definitions demand the death of the offender, whereas others 
require that the offender only embark upon the mission with the expectation of not 
surviving. Other attributes of the definition include the targeting of non-combatants—a 
term that is highly controversial in itself—but who usually are civilians, and some 
definitions stipulate that the mission is politically motivated (Bloom, 2011; Davis, 2013; 
Gade, 2010; Sheehan, 2014).  
According to Bloom (2011), terrorist leaders consider suicide bombers the 
“ultimate smart bomb” and the most effective way to terrorize. It is a low-cost, high-
return method, costing approximately $150 per mission. Suicide bombers are able to 
maneuver, take calculated risks, penetrate deep into crowds, and think on their feet 
should circumstances change. However, using suicide bombers is usually a last resort for 
terrorist groups. They first run through the gamut of traditional strategies and warfare, 
and when these fail, they employ suicide bombers (Bloom 2011; Davis, 2013). Yet, just 
because suicide bombers have been shown to be a last-resort option, they should not be 
underestimated. According to Pape and Feldman (2010), “from 1980 to 2001, suicide 
attacks accounted for 3 percent of terrorist incidents but caused half of the total deaths 
due to terrorism―even if one excludes the unusually large number of fatalities of 9/11” 
(p. 5). In other words, suicide bombers may be a minority within the arsenal of tools 
available to global terrorism, they are the most destructive tool in that arsenal.  
 
Profile and Statistics 
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To begin, there is no single demographic profile for female attackers, even though 
their rarity warrants the assumption that a distinct psychological profile might exist 
(Merari, 2010). In addition to some overlapping motivational considerations, too many 
other elements are involved for there to be one particular causal or root factor. Sheehan 
(2014) posits that this could work in favor of some scholars who might feel that a 
psychological explanation of suicide bombers could delegitimize the “political and social 
grievances” that are the basis of their studies. The general consensus among terrorism and 
international relations scholars is that suicide bombers are not mentally ill, that they are 
“normal” people who are acting out for religious, or more likely, political reasons for 
their country or society (Sheehan, 2014).  
According to CPOST (2016), between the years 1974 and 2016, 221 suicide 
attacks were perpetrated by women. It is also interesting to note that, while 2,360 suicide 
attacks were executed by men, 2,284 were caused by those whose gender is unknown 
(CPOST, 2016). The females’ “kill rate” is averaged at 10.3 people per attack, compared 
to 9.2 for men. The CPOST data also show the type of weapon used in each suicide 
attack. Belt bombs were used 174 times, car bombs 21 times, and the remainder are 
classified as either “other” or “unknown” (CPOST, 2016). While CPOST data show a 
total of 4,865 suicide attacks since 1974, the Global Terrorism Database, run by the 
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 
indicates that number as 4,071. Also, START documents only 51 cases under the 
category of “female suicide” because this database makes distinctions between “bomber,” 
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“attacker,” and other various terms that could skew the data (CPOST, 2016; START, 
2016.  
Compared with much of the literature in terrorism studies, CPOST’s estimate of 
221 FSB attacks is on the low side. But CPOST’s methodology reports only bombings 
verified by two persons, and bombings in which the attacker is killed. One of the reasons 
that many scholars believe these numbers are low is that FSBs in Al Qaeda, for example, 
are seldom identified, and “reports about their frequency vary wildly between Western 
and local sources” (Bloom, 2011, p. 19). Overall, however, Atran (2010) reports the 
percentage of FSBs correlates with the typical number of women who commit homicide 
and women who participate in combat in the military. The fact that there is consistency in 
numbers for women across all violent acts makes it seem likely that having a general 
psychological profile for violent women could prove useful in the research of FSBs. 
 
History 
 
Suicide terrorists have existed for at least two millennia, and according to Jones 
(2008), “religion runs through the history” (p. 17; Moghadam, 2008). The earliest 
recorded self-sacrificing terrorist group was the Jewish Zealots or Sicarii of the first 
century C.E., whose tactic was to stab their adversaries with the expectation of being 
executed themselves only moments later. From there, some other groups followed suit: 
for example, the Muslim Assassins who operated as far back as the twelfth century. 
These early terrorist/assassins did not plan to escape from their terrorist acts either; in 
fact, to survive could be considered shameful (Bloom, 2011; Pedahzur, 2005; Sheehan, 
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2014). By the twentieth century, groups such as the Russian Anarchists (who used 
dynamite as their weapon of choice) and the 2,000 World War II Japanese kamikaze 
pilots (who used their own planes as bombs) were committing suicidal acts for their 
political agendas. 4	According to Sheehan (2014), the 1981 Iran-sponsored bombing of 
the Iraqi embassy in Beirut is considered to be the beginning of modern-day suicide 
operations.  
Women became involved in terrorist groups in the late nineteenth century in 
Russia, and not again until the late 1960s, when they joined Marxist organizations in 
Europe and nationalist movements in the Middle East. They joined the ranks of suicide 
bombers in the 1980s (Bloom, 2011, p. 33; Speckard, 2008). Hamas and other Islamic 
jihadi groups initially resisted the participation of females in martyrdom operations, 
declaring that women should “remain home and perform their established roles as 
mothers and wives” (Agara, 2015, p. 121). But in 2002, Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat 
gave a speech called “army of roses” that granted women the right to join the struggle 
and become suicide bombers. Later that day, Wafa Idris (who will be revisited in a later 
section) became the first Palestinian FSB (Agara, 2015; Gentry & Sjoberg, 2015).  
When terrorist groups began using women as suicide bombers, they found them to 
be more effective than men. As mentioned previously, FSBs are more successful, with 
their kill rates 11 percent above those of men (CPOST, 2016). This difference can be 
explained by several factors. First, women do not, or did not initially, rouse suspicion 
because women are not stereotypically threatening. And because people are generally less 
                                               
4 Although there are recent arguments put forth that many kamikaze pilots did not act on their own volition 
(Allen-Hermanson, 2016). 
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suspicious of women, they can venture deeper into stores and markets where larger 
crowds gather. Women can also conceal a bomb more effectively by creating the 
appearance of pregnancy covered by long flowing clothes (Bloom, 2005; Davis, 2013; 
Speckhard 2008). This is an advantage in conservative countries because it is culturally 
offensive for a male soldier to frisk a woman, especially if she appears to be pregnant, 
and thus she can get through checkpoints and border crossings more easily.  
FSBs are more likely to be in their mid-to-late 20s, which is older than male 
attackers who are generally in their early 20s (Post et al., 2014). Moreover, attacks by 
women gain more media attention than do those by men, which subsequently helps the 
recruiting efforts of terrorist organizations. Once the men of many terrorist groups see 
that a woman has completed what they consider to be a “man’s job,” often times men’s 
pride will create a surge in new recruits (Lankford, 2014; Merari, 2010). Women are also 
seen as expendable to these groups. Although they play many roles in terrorist groups, 
they usually cannot serve on the front lines (Atran, 2010).  
 
Gender Issues 
 
Despite representing a small fraction of the suicide bombers, females tend to be 
demonized by the media more than the men are. Bloom (2011) explains:  
Perpetrating acts that cause wanton destruction, death, and disorder seems 
incompatible with the traditional stereotype of what is expected of women—to be 
nurturing, caring figures who provide stability. The common assumption is that 
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female terrorists must be even more depressed, crazier, more suicidal, or more 
psychopathic than their male counterparts. (p. 34)                                                    
According to scholars like Bloom, people throughout the world seem culturally or 
instinctively accustomed to believe that there must be something extremely wrong with a 
woman for her to become a bomber. The existence of females suicide bombers creates a 
disturbing scenario for many because it challenges preconceived patriarchal notions of 
what a woman should be (Gentry & Sjoberg, 2015). MacDonald (1992) argues that by 
participation in these nefarious crimes, women are actually committing “a double 
atrocity,” first by using violence and second by destroying our traditional view of a 
woman. Norozhna and Knight (2016) recently noted that “female suicide bombers were 
analyzed and portrayed first and foremost as women” and that, even in death, “they 
remained the devalued shadow of male suicide perpetrators” (p. 14).  
The fact that we, in the Western world, still have these deep-seated notions of 
women’s character, “what a woman should be,” as much as we would like to deny and 
suppress them, is an issue. We should not be any more shocked and awed by women’s 
capability to be so exasperated or angry that they resort to martyrdom than we are by men 
committing the same crimes. A woman who commits an atrocious act, no matter how 
horrible, to protect her children, is held as a victor of motherhood, a hero for all women. 
But she is not given the same agency when she commits the same act for herself, or for 
her sacred values. We cannot deny that women have the same political grievances or 
frustrations as men, most that have accumulated and manifested over many years.  
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The first commonly recognized female suicide bomber was a seventeen-year-old 
girl named Sana’a Mehaydali in Lebanon (Bloom, 2011; Mogghadam, 2008; Narozhna & 
Knight, 2016; Speckhard, 2008). On April 9, 1985, she drove a bomb-laden car into an 
Israeli convoy, killing herself and two others and thus sparking a phenomenon that has 
seen several spikes in recent years. Since then, at least 26 terrorist organizations have 
used FSBs. After the Lebanese pro-Syrian group, the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party 
(SSNP), helped send Mehaydali to her death, other groups followed its lead: the Sri 
Lankan Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE); the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK); a 
Chechen rebel group; Hamas; Hezbollah; Al Qaeda; Islamic State (ISIS); Boko Haram, 
which has now surpassed LTTE as the group that has used the most FSBs; plus 17 other 
terrorist groups that have employed FSBs to expand their range of tactics (Bloom, 2011; 
CPOST, 2016; Speckhard, 2008).  
 
PATHWAY I: TYPICAL PATH FOR FEMALE SUICIDE BOMBERS 
 
 
Female Case Studies 
 
In order paint a typical picture of many FSB’s circumstances that ultimately act as 
motivations for a suicide attack, two case studies will be explored that occurred in 
Palestine in 2002. While the stories are similar in geography and year, they are inversions 
of one another. Furthermore, Palestine is the focus here because the most comprehensive 
research about FSBs tends to stem from this region, and the juxtaposition of the two cases 
also highlights how even similar circumstances can evoke different motivations.   
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One of the most famous FSBs was an aid worker for the Palestinian Red Crescent 
Society: Wafa Idris. Wafa was raised in a Palestinian refugee camp. When she was a 
teenager, she fell in love with her cousin, and although pre-arranged, they married, and 
she became pregnant (Pedahzur, 2005, p.139). But, the baby was stillborn and her doctors 
pronounced her infertile. Because of this, her husband not only divorced her, but married 
a friend of Wafa’s. Confined to her small community, she had to watch his wedding and 
attend the celebration of the birth of his child with his new wife (Bloom, 2011; Narozhna 
& Knight, 2016; Speckhard, 2008). Living under the cultural norms of Palestinian 
Muslim society, she was stigmatized and labeled an infertile divorcée, and consequently 
would never be able to remarry. Running away was not an option; not only would it be 
personally devastating, it would also disgrace her family. Years passed and she was still 
living with her parents. Unable to fulfill her cultural role as wife and mother, she saw no 
other options for herself, so on January 27, 2002, Wafa walked into a Jerusalem grocery 
store and exploded a bomb that killed her and one other and injured more than 100 
(Bloom, 2005; Pedahzur, 2005, p. 139). 
In an interview with Wafa’s family, journalist Barbara Victor claims the family 
told her that Wafa was depressed over the loss of her husband and child (Speckhard, 
2008). Conversely, Speckhard claims that in her own interview with Wafa’s family, they 
said they had told Victor that Wafa wasn’t depressed, that she had put her divorce and 
infertility behind her, and that the occupation is what led to her destruction (2008). Victor 
(2003) clarified by stating that Wafa’s parents initially blamed the occupation for Wafa’s 
actions, but after some probing, “her mother said bluntly that if Wafa had been able to 
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have kids, she probably wouldn’t have killed herself.” Despite varying interpretations of 
Wafa’s situation, interviews of failed FSBs have revealed that bombers seldom tell their 
parents and family of their plans. According to Lankford (2014), “given the ability to 
control their public reputation through words they utter, most people would rather be 
remembered as heroic martyrs than suicidal cowards” (p. 355). Because of this secrecy of 
FSBs and their reluctance to confide in family about true motivations, interviewers often 
receive conflicting reports about an FSB’s state of mind.  
We will never know the exact sequence of events that lead to Wafa choosing to 
murder and end her life in such a violent manner. Shame and honor are dominant tenets 
in their culture, so for Wafa’s parents to disclose the pain their daughter endured and how 
it could seemingly ruin her life might potentially cause a stigma to surround their 
daughter’s death and their family. By their claiming it was the occupation that 
disheartened her and not her infertility or divorce, Wafa is likely to be remembered more 
as an honorable heroine instead of a troubled woman with a bleak future. The caution 
here is that interviews with families of successful suicide bombers can be misleading 
because the family wants to portray their loved one in as positive a light as possible 
(Merari, 2010; Pedahzur, 2005). Sheehan (2014) also states, “loved ones can be oblivious 
to the inner turmoil of the person engaging in these acts” (p. 86). Or, even if they are 
aware of such emotional insecurity, families may downplay any actions the attacker may 
have taken that could be construed as suicidal. This is because suicide is regarded as a sin 
in most of the cultures where suicide bombing is prevalent. In addition, there is also the 
societal pressure to support and celebrate the successful bombing mission in societies that 
  
 
24 
support terrorism. After examining the evidence, it appears that, at least in Wafa’s case, 
the occupation motive could merely be one of many reasons she chose a suicide mission. 
Only a month after Wafa’s attack, Darine Abu Aisha became the second 
Palestinian female suicide bomber (Pedahzur, 2005, p. 139; Victor, 2003). Darine was 
born into a privileged family, was religious, strong-willed, and wanted to become an 
academic and travel the world. In fact, she attended university and excelled in her studies. 
Nonetheless, there was enormous pressure on her to marry, but she didn’t want that kind 
of life because, in a conversation with her best friend, Darine stated, “she never intended 
on becoming a slave” (Victor, 2003). But, Darine knew she would be condemned to a life 
that included an arranged marriage and many children; her fate as a Palestinian woman 
was sealed. Like Wafa, she felt she was without options and trapped in a life ruled by 
patriarchal norms. Darien eventually snuck out of her parent’s house and exploded her 
suicide belt, wounding three policemen at a checkpoint near Jerusalem (Pedahzur, 2005, 
p. 139; Victor, 2003). Bloom (2005) argues that this is the main difference between men 
and women suicide bombers: for women, “becoming a suicide bomber is a way to escape 
the predestined life that is expected of them” (p. 145).  
Blocked Futures 
One of the more salient reasons noted for FSBs’ motivations is an oppressed life 
plagued by defined female roles in conservative cultures. Thayer and Hudson (2010) 
show that terrorism and the gender oppression that plagues many FSBs may indeed go 
hand in hand: 
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Some analysts have raised the possibility that Islamic conceptions of 
gender differences and the extreme differences in the way the sexes are 
treated contribute to the virulence of Islamic terrorism. Indeed, some 
scholars are beginning to explore whether the rationalization of terrorism 
is related to the rationalization of violence against, and oppression of, 
women. (p. 45) 
In some conservative and religious societies, women who are infertile or who 
have been sexually “compromised” by rape or unintentional pregnancy are ineligible for 
marriage, creating a particularly humiliating and devastating situation for the woman 
(Bloom 2005; Davis, 2013; Pedahzur, 2005, p. 139). Additionally, some women can even 
face a merciless death at the hands of their fathers or brothers for conceiving out of 
wedlock (Victor, 2003). Women suffering from physical or mental deformities can also 
be considered flawed by societal norms, and because of this, they can suffer from social 
condemnation and sanctions from the community, leading to their being stigmatized 
(Bloom, 2005; Pedahzur, 2005, p. 140; Speckhard, 2008). Speckhard (2008) calls these 
social stigmas “blocked lives” or blocked futures. Those with blocked futures or 
compromised pasts are likely to be depressed and have very few options available to 
them, especially in regions rife with occupation and conflict, potentially causing them to 
have suicidal ideations. However, Speckhard (2008) argues that these blocked lives are 
not primary motivators for FSBs; rather, they lower the women’s resistance and increase 
their vulnerability to ideology that promotes suicide attacks. Like Thayer and Hudson 
(2010), Elshtain (2003) believes that the interconnectedness of fundamentalist ideology 
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and female subjugation is something not to be ignored, stating, “We underestimate the 
centrality of the gender question at our peril. […] Gender practices are not a sidebar to 
the war against terrorism as a cultural struggle, but a central issue” (p. 33). If women in 
these conservative and repressive regions were not subjugated to the extent that they are, 
perhaps some would have other outlets for their grievances or be able to create positive 
change from within these communities.  
Approximately nine percent of FSB are the Tamil Tigers, or LTTE of Sri Lanka. 
Similar to the women in Muslim countries, conservative Hindu women cannot get 
married or have children if they are raped, which can lead to a stigmatized and 
unfulfilling life (Post, 2007, p. 237). In a horrific twist, according to Bloom (2005), 
“Family members often encourage rape victims to join LTTE” because there are no other 
options in life for them (p. 160). There are even cases in the LTTE where the men 
covertly raped their own family members with the purpose of recruiting more suicide 
bombers for their cause (Bloom, 2005). With this, for a woman who can no longer have 
children, joining the resistance group and becoming a suicide bomber may be the only 
way she can redeem herself and rid the family of embarrassment (Bloom 2005; Gentry & 
Sjoberg, 2015; Narozhna & Knight, 2016). Bloom (2011) explains, that condemned 
women understand that “with one act of violence they go from being a source of family 
shame to a source of family pride” and also achieve redemption for themselves (p. 31; 
Gentry & Sjoberg, 2015; Merari, 2010; Moghadam, 2008). In turn, these victims of 
sexual violence end up facing double oppression—political oppression and gender 
oppression (MacDonald, 1992).  
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We know that many of these women who are stigmatized also feel shame and, 
according to Speckhard (2008), women who act out of anger towards the enemy could be 
concealing shame. She also argues, “One way to interrupt it [shame] is by engaging the 
effect of anger,” as anger can mask shame (Speckhard, 2008, p. 1014). According to this 
notion, men in these societies have more socially acceptable ways to express anger. In 
women, lacking similar release valves, anger can build to such an extent that some decide 
to rid themselves of their shame and stigma (by taking their own lives) and act out their 
anger (by taking the lives of those they blame) in explosive ways. For the women who 
become FSBs, Bloom (2005) notes, “becoming a martyr is their sole expression of 
outrage” (p. 145). Indeed, many women in these cultures experience the same traumas, 
but most women in their situations do not commit violence, murder, or suicide. This is 
why I argue that many intersecting factors are present when a female decides to become a 
suicide bomber. 
By examining females, the intent is not to claim that some of these personal issues 
are not relevant to males as well. Speckard (2008) argues, “societal degradation, 
hopelessness, and having made an irrevocable choice to join a terrorist group are 
elements in the decision to volunteer as a bomber, but this is not necessarily just a female 
issue” (p. 1012) That is to say that many young men have the same concerns, and that 
there may be many such similarities between men and women to become suicide 
bombers. However, women can face the threat of honor killings by her family or can be 
forced into prostitution to survive, all for bringing shame upon the family (Thayer and 
Hudson, 2010; Victor, 2003). Because of this, Jacques and Taylor (2008) argue, “females 
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[are] more likely to be motivated than males by a desire to end their life, unhappiness 
with their personal situation, or family and personal problems. In contrast, more males 
than females were motivated by nationalistic beliefs, overt religious beliefs, foreign 
policy, or pressures stemming from their extremist social group” (p. 315) And while men 
face family shame as well, they are not stigmatized to the same extent as women are in 
the more conservative countries where these attacks are happening.  
 
Durkheim’s Suicide Theories 
 
As previously suggested in this paper’s introduction, there is a gap in DAT that 
fails to adequately explain the process between an individual becoming a devoted actor, 
who is fused to a group and its sacred values, and that devoted actor making the decision 
to self-sacrifice. In order to fill this explanatory gap, two categories within Durkheim’s 
theory of suicide can help account for the phenomenon of suicide terrorism: his concepts 
of “fatalistic” and “acute altruistic” suicide. A relevant aspect of these two categories of 
suicide is that they are usually applied to persons in societies that are in socio-economic 
and political transitions, not unlike the regions where most suicide bombings occur 
(Davies and Neal, 2000; Pedahzur, 2005; Speckhard, 2008). Fatalistic suicidal ideations 
can stem from hopeless situations caused by continuous political oppression, where an 
individual sees a blocked future for him or herself with no escape (Davies and Neal, 
2000, p. 43). Alternatively, acute altruistic suicidal ideations derive from a desire to act 
for a cause, but on the condition that a spiritual afterlife awaits (Pedahzur et al., 2003). In 
an attempt to parse out the two types of suicide, Pedahzur et al. (2003) explain, “If a 
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person commits suicide to fulfill his duty, his psychological state may either be one of 
serene conviction (altruism) or it may be one of extreme fear and despair (fatalism)” (p. 
411). I argue that these two positions are not mutually exclusive and that in the case of 
most FSBs it is a combination of the two. 
 
Fatalistic Suicide  
 
The first part to address is fatalistic suicide, “a more individualistic dimension and 
[where one] sees the suicidal act as an escape route from a situation of no hope” 
(Pedahzur et al., 2003, p. 420). Many FSBs come from regions rife with oppressive tenets 
towards women that can lead to hopeless situations with no expectation of change. 
Moreover, many women experience personal trauma that can directly lead to “blocked 
lives” or bleak futures (Speckhard, 2008). Durkheim himself explained fatalism as “that 
of persons with futures pitilessly blocked and passions violently choked by oppressive 
discipline” (Davies and Neal, 2000, p. 42). Many FSBs likely see life as meaningless due 
to the oppression and stigmatization that can come with their positions in life. Based on 
this premise, it is plausible that many FSBs may indeed have fatalistic suicidal ideations. 
It also conceivable that male suicide bombers may experience fatalistic suicidal ideations 
as well, but according to most research, this path seems to be more typical for FSBs.   
Acute Altruistic Suicide 
The second element, which many scholars point to as a probable causal 
explanation for suicide bombers, is altruism (Bongar et al. 2014; Merari, 2010; 
Moghadam, 2008; Pedahzur et al., 2003). Altruism, according to the biological definition 
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in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, is when an organism’s behavior “benefits 
other organisms, at a cost to itself” (Okasha 2013). We see this idea in fusion theory, 
when an individual shows a willingness to sacrifice one’s self for their group.5 Tobeña 
(2012) argues, for example, that a suicide attack is the very definition of altruism, 
claiming, “They offer their lives as a supreme investment for others’ interests” (p. 1). It 
may be useful to note that Durkheim originally used altruistic suicide to explain military 
operations, which entail an implicit agreement of potential self-sacrifice in times of 
conflict (Merari, 2010).  
More recently, evolutionary approaches have also drawn from the concept of 
altruistic suicide, because those who adhere to inclusive fitness theory (aka kin selection) 
believe that making costly sacrifices for one's in-group can help to out-compete rival 
groups and thus increase the fitness of their relations (Sheikh et al., 2014). And as DAT 
claims, fused individuals view other group members as “fictive kin” and will self-
sacrifice to increase the fitness of the group. In other words, altruism alludes to 
psychological, philosophical, or religious connection and concern for the well-being of 
the group at one’s own expense (Atran, 2010). This approach to altruism ostensibly fits 
with both local and extended fusion, but a specific type of altruism is more applicable to 
most suicide terrorists.  
A specific Durkheimian subtype of altruism, acute altruistic suicide, is more 
suitable to describe most modern suicide terrorism than the grander notion of altruism. It 
                                               
5 For an in-depth discussion on the biological concept of altruism, along with the problems and definitions 
see Okasha (2013).  
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is essentially altruism with an added suicidal and religious or spiritual objective. But this 
idea refers not only to a theistic realm. In fact, one way Durkheim (1951) described acute 
altruism is an individual experiencing a “joy of sacrifice” along with a renunciation of the 
personal-self to be able to discover their “true essence” (p. 225). This concept can easily 
be applied to those who ascribe to theism or atheism, and the many viewpoints in 
between. In particular, Pedahzur et al. (2003) claim that acute altruistic suicide is a good 
fit with Islamic martyrdom because, “[t]hese individuals perceive a lofty and glorious 
place for themselves in the spiritual and mystical realm beyond life on earth” (p. 408).   
As such, when understood as a form of acute altruism, it fits that suicide bombers 
feel so connected with their social group that they place greater value on the group than 
on their own lives, yet their death also serves the religious goal of earning a place in the 
afterlife. In fact, according to Merari (2010), Durkheim also equated this type of suicide 
glorious place for themselves in the spiritual and mystical realm beyond life on earth” (p. 
408).  As such, when understood as a form of acute altruism, it fits that suicide bombers 
feel so connected with their social group that they place greater value on the group than 
on their own lives, yet their death also serves the religious goal of earning a place in the 
afterlife. In fact, according to Merari (2010), Durkheim also equated this type of suicide 
with Christian martyrs: “Though they did not kill themselves, they sought death with all 
their power and behaved so as to make it inevitable” (p. 200). In this way, the religious 
idea of martyrdom that most suicide bombers hold coincides with acute altruistic suicide, 
where the goal is for the betterment of the group, but they are also motivated by the belief 
that paradise awaits.  
  
 
32 
Acute altruistic suicide is an appropriate descriptor for both male and female 
suicide terrorists. However, the individualistic, fatalistic component may be better suited 
to describe females, as males have shown less proclivity for personal motives and more 
for nationalistic and religious motivations to commit a suicide attack (Bloom, 2011; 
Jacques & Taylor, 2008). Accordingly, fatalistic suicidal ideations are an essential 
element that can drive many FSBs to their acute-altruistic convictions. 
 
Suicidal Ideations 
 
Creating an ideal profile for conclusively determining the motivations of FSBs 
may be close to impossible but determining a set of the most plausible factors could 
prove helpful. Given the heated political climate in much of the areas of the world where 
FSBs are active, it is reasonable to assume the motivations behind these bombings would 
be political. But Merari (2010) argues that it is presumptuous to make such a claim 
because far too many people are inundated with political grievances in these regions who 
do not participate in terrorist activities. Even among terrorist groups, the number of 
suicide bombers is minuscule, and female suicide bombers are even fewer (Merari, 
2010). In fact, Merari (2010) argues that the rarity of these FSBs may warrant a 
discussion that these women could perhaps share distinct character traits, and evidence 
suggests that fatalistic suicidality could be a common factor.  
Shneidman (1996) describes suicide as, “an exclusively human response to 
extreme psychological pain, a lonely and desperate solution for the sufferer who can no 
longer see any alternatives” (p. 132). The Oxford English Dictionary’s definition is “One 
  
 
33 
who dies by his own hand; one who commits self-murder.” Proceeding from these 
descriptions, Lankford (2014) claims that suicide bombers are suicidal by definition.  
In contrast, however, much of the scholarship in terrorism studies, with only a few 
voices of opposition, indicate that suicide bombers are not suicidal and that suicide 
bombers do not show typical signs of suicidal ideation (Dean, 2014, p. 30; Lankford; 
2014; Lester et al., 2004; Merari, 2010; Sheehan, 2014). However, Sheehan (2014) 
argues, “Despite widespread acceptance of the claim that suicide terrorists are not 
suicidal, the evidence for this claim is weak” (p. 84). He claims that extensive 
“systematic evaluations” have not been implemented and that evidence that disputes the 
suicidality of bombers can sometimes come from the leaders of terrorist groups, who 
have every reason to portray the celebratory side of martyrdom for public relations and 
recruitment reasons (Sheehan, 2014). Moreover, many of these studies examined suicide 
bombers in general and likely did not factor in the differing elements for women (Gentry 
& Sjoberg, 2015; Narozhna & Knight, 2016). However, FSBs may have distinctive 
personal traumatic experiences that can produce fatalistic suicidal ideations, in addition to 
the nationalistic or religious motivations more commonly found in males (Bloom, 2005). 
 
Fatalistic Suicidal Ideations 
 
As a case in point, two studies done on young, rural, Chinese female suicides in 
the mid-1990s illustrate how oppressed females can develop fatalistic suicidal thoughts 
due to their desperate and gendered situations (Davies & Neal, 2000; Pritchard, 1996; 
Zhang et al., 2010). Davies and Neal (2000) analyzed data from research on the 
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comparison of youth suicides in Asian and Western countries. The results revealed that 
rural China’s young female suicide rate was overwhelmingly high; in fact, it was the 
“highest recorded female suicide rate in the world” (Pritchard, 1996, p. 363). While 
Chinese females in general had a higher suicide rate than the other countries studied, the 
rate for females aged 15-24 living in rural China was remarkably higher (Davies and 
Neal, 2000; Pritchard, 1996; Zhang, 2010). Davies and Neal (2000) explain the reasons 
behind these results:  
Exceptionally high young female suicidal rates in rural China are best 
explained in terms of Durkheim’s categories of fatalistic and altruistic 
suicide. The suicide of young Chinese women is indeed […] fatalistic 
suicide. A woman in the age group of 15-24 in rural China is and always 
has been expected to marry a husband chosen for her by her family; she 
has very little choice (Butterfield 1982:167). She can neither refuse to 
marry this person, nor refuse to marry at all, nor marry someone else. […] 
Her situation is not that of a slave for she is part of a system in which 
everyone accepts the legitimacy of these harsh rules and expectations. […] 
It is not surprising that many women of the marrying age group commit 
suicide to escape this pitiless future. (p. 44) 
Davies and Neal (2000) claim these young women were not slaves because they 
were forced into marriage, that it was just part of the culture, a sentiment that Darine Abu 
Aisha disagreed with from her own experience (Victor, 2003). Regardless of how an 
arranged marriage is defined, the situations that Darine and the Chinese women faced 
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were similar and ultimately contributed to their decision to commit suicide. In fact, this 
narrative is not unlike the situations that many FSBs find themselves in, trapped in a 
deep-rooted patriarchy that disparages women where they do not have the freedom to 
make their own life choices. In addition, the Confucian and Islamic traditional 
conservative societies both place a stigma on suicide (Zhang, 2009). However, the 
difference here is that most FSBs live in areas of intractable conflict, in which others can 
be blamed for some of their grievances. Furthermore, the FSBs can find a way around 
their cultural taboos of suicide, but in order to carry it out, they must also kill others.  
A 2014 study done on the suicidality of adults in Baghdad, Iraq—the country with 
the highest rate of suicide terrorism—showed that suicidal thoughts are not unusual given 
the conflict and violence that has engulfed their lives for decades (Alshawi et al., 2015; 
CPOST, 2016. From the participant group of the Alshawi study, 15% had suicidal 
thoughts. Of particular note here, the women scored higher at 19% as opposed to 10% for 
the men. This study also showed that simply being female in this region increased one’s 
vulnerability to effects from trauma exposure (Alshawi et Al., 2015). Women who had 
lost a family member were also more vulnerable to suicidal thoughts. Due to the sensitive 
nature of the study and stigma attached to suicide in Muslim countries, the researchers 
believe these numbers to be an underestimation of adults with suicidal thoughts in 
Baghdad (Alshawi et Al., 2015). This study thus lends support for the arguments 
presented, linking FSBs motivations with fatalistic suicidal ideations resulting from 
personal trauma. Furthermore, most FSBs hail from countries not unlike Iraq, where 
violence and conflict are prevalent, thus suggesting another possible link between the 
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study and FSBs. Given the discussion above, it seems that we must consider the personal 
reasons that may lead to a FSB’s mission. In fact, Speckhard (2008) argues: 
Suicide terrorism for these individuals [females] does not differ that much 
from traditional suicide—for the person carrying it out, it can be 
understood not only in its political context, but on a personal level as an 
expression of pain, a call for help, and includes a desire to escape 
overwhelming “psyche ache”—the variable identified by famed suicide 
researcher Ed Shneidman as the most important factor in predicting a 
normal suicide. (p. 1016)  
Many FSBs face oppression and stigmatization, which can lead to depression, 
some are raped, for which they will bear the blame in the Islamic countries where FSBs 
are most common, and they can also be held responsible for the preservation of their 
families’ honor (Speckhard, 2008). A study done on stigmatized LGBTQ people in the 
Philippines by Reyes et al. (2017) supports the argument that social stigma can be 
correlated with suicidal ideation. The results showed that experienced stigma from the 
majority culture and hopelessness were strongly connected and that stigma “is the 
strongest predictor of suicidal behavior” (Reyes et al., 2017, p. 5). The researchers also 
claim that women are at greater risk for suicidal ideation.  
The issues mentioned above represent markers for fatalistic ideations. It is not 
difficult to see why some of these women would turn to suicide, although the killing of 
others in the process creates a complex and unsettling dynamic. They have suffered under 
occupation and conflict, often losing friends and family members, and ultimately need 
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someone to blame (Bloom, 2011). This combination of personal trauma in a hostile 
environment can create an atmosphere in which one wishes to die while simultaneously 
enacting revenge for grievances (Jacques & Taylor, 2008; Speckhard, 2008). I am not 
suggesting that all female suicide bombers are suicidal—that is a claim which would 
need further empirical support. Nevertheless, taking all the evidence into account, the 
data are striking enough to argue that we can no longer claim that many of these women 
are not suicidal.  
While terrorism-related datasets have grown in the last decade, there is still a 
significant need for more “psychological autopsies” of FSBs (CPOST, 2016; Lester et al., 
2004; Sheehan, 2014). According to Lester et al. (2004), “a psychological autopsy 
involves reconstructing the life of the suicide from birth on, with a particular focus on 
recent events, stressors, mood, statements, and behaviors, by means of interviews with all 
of the significant others, friends, and colleagues in the suicide’s life” (p. 284). This 
method is ideal, but given the myriad of complications with interviews, the desire for 
some interviewees and family members to distance themselves from the crime, a 
reluctance to speak with outsiders, and the custom of not speaking ill of the dead, the 
challenge in obtaining accurate profiles can prove daunting (Merari, 2010; Speckhard, 
2008).  
 
Acute Altruistic Suicidal Ideations 
 
Studies have shown that religion can serve as a protective shield from mainstream 
suicide attempts by offering comfort and community to participating members (Merari, 
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2010; Norko et al., 2017). However, some scholars acknowledge that the stigma 
surrounding suicide could potentially influence this idea (Liddle & Shackelford, 2014; 
Sheehan, 2014). Sheehan (2014) agrees when he writes that the findings, “may be biased 
since disclosure of suicidal ideation and behavior might be lower in people with religious 
affiliations because of the taboos against it” (Sheehan, 2014, p. 87). Nonetheless, some 
studies suggest that religion could actually be a catalyst for suicide through martyrdom 
operations (Bélanger et al., 2014). For instance, Zahedzadeh (2015) emphasizes that 
“devotion to certain beliefs may facilitate support for suicide attacks, provide martyrs the 
reward of an afterlife, an eternal place in heaven, or contain narratives that glorify acts of 
combative martyrdom” (p. 2). Although martyrdom has been historically accepted in 
Islam and most major religious traditions, traditional suicide is prohibited and is a 
cardinal sin (Belanger et al., 2014). Because of this, post facto bombers and family 
members of dead suicide terrorists may not be forthright in their interviews in order to 
preserve the religious purity of themselves or a loved one (Merari, 2010; Stern, 2003). 
Even if they were truthful, according to Sheehan (2014), devout “people in the Muslim 
world often miss psychiatric symptoms or interpret them from a religious perspective. 
For example, negative signs of psychosis (withdrawal, poverty of thought) may be 
interpreted in terms of piety, while positive ones (auditory or visual hallucinations) are 
viewed as ‘gifts of God’” (p. 87). This demonstrates that reports about the mindset of a 
suicide terrorist might not only be misleading but could be completely inaccurate. In 
other words, FSBs could indeed have fatalistic and acute altruistic suicidal ideations, but 
these thoughts could be disguised or overlooked by religious interpretations.  
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This leads to the question: does belief that one will journey to an afterlife make 
that desire to do so something different than being suicidal? Neustadter (2010) claims 
that it does not, and calls suicidal ideations among religious people “death fantasies” or 
transpersonal/spiritual motivation for suicide. This description appears to verify and align 
with Durkheim’s acute altruistic suicide theory. Transpersonal motivation derives not 
from the desire necessarily to end one’s life, but instead from the desire to be in a 
different state, in a different place (Neustadter, 2010). But even with this distinction, such 
a motivation is still classified as a suicidal ideation, specifically an acute altruistic one for 
FSBs.  
Whether an individual wants to end his or her life in hopes that something better 
awaits, or because the current life is unbearable, it is still considered suicide. Neustadter 
(2010) stresses, “[s]uicide often arises not from a hatred of life, but from a lust for it, a 
desire for things to be otherwise, for life to be full when it appears not to be” (p. 30). An 
individual’s desire to cross over to an afterlife, free from the oppression and conflict 
many FSBs face, is certainly understandable. The critical difference is that FSBs are not 
only willing to die, but also willing to kill for it (Bloom, 2011; Stern, 2003). 
The most compelling indication of the prevalence of acute altruistic suicidal 
ideations among suicide bombers is how successfully terrorist groups cater to them. 
Skirting the religious prohibition of suicide, some clerical leaders, such as Hezbollah’s 
Ayatollah Fadlallah, have reinterpreted Islamic texts and thus, “have reframed the suicide 
bombings into martyrdom operations” (Post, 2007, p. 233). Based on empirical studies, 
promoting the fantasy of a carefree afterlife is a major recruitment tool of Islamic terrorist 
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groups (Bloom, 2011; Pedahzur, 2005). In contrast to the conventional views on suicide, 
as Merari (2010) indicates, “Martyrdom operations have used religion as a facilitator 
rather than an inhibitor” (p. 208). In other words, terrorist groups stress that becoming a 
martyr will send a man straight to a heavenly paradise and that Allah will provide him 
with a harem of virgins—or in a woman’s case, the promise to be a beautiful bride 
(Thayer & Hudson, 2010). There is no reason to believe that this afterlife motivation is 
any different between males and females because they both believe they are doing God’s 
work and will be rewarded with the forgiveness of all sins and immediate entrance into 
paradise (Moghadam, 2008). Therefore, these terrorist groups are able to justify 
deploying “human bombs” by using this promise of a positive afterlife (Merari, 2010, p. 
242).  
While that may indeed be true, it is important to note that the terrorist ideology of 
martyrdom differs from the traditional Islamic understanding of martyrdom and is widely 
condemned by many Muslim clerics and scholars, although both interpretations can be 
found in the Quran (Jones, 2008; Liddle & Shackelford, 2014; Merari, 2010). In fact, in 
September 2014, 120 Muslim scholars from around the world penned an 18-page “Open 
letter to Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi,” the leader of the Islamic State (ISIS), to refute his 
interpretations of the sacred Islamic texts (2014). 
While this explanation of martyrdom does not apply to all suicide bombers, 
especially those of a different religion or those with secular predilections, the 
overwhelming majority of suicide attacks have been carried out by Islamist groups that 
adhere to this belief (CPOST, 2016 Merari, 2010). It is because of these reasons that is it 
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not difficult to understand why many scholars argue that religious devotion could be 
primary factor in the motivations of suicide terrorists (Liddle & Shackelford, 2014; 
Merari, 2010; Thayer & Hudson, 2010).   
In addition to the religious glorification for a martyrdom mission, Liddle and 
Shackelford (2014) also insist that “belief in the afterlife is likely to have a strong impact 
on the cost benefit analysis of engaging in suicide terrorism by minimizing the projected 
costs” (p. 43). That is to say, committing a suicide attack based on religious beliefs or on 
behalf of a collectivist ideology can mitigate personal responsibility, perhaps even 
making it easier to commit and possibly “morally disengage” from the act (Atran, 2016; 
Moghadam, 2008, p. 225). 
The religious proscription, along with the social stigma, of suicide is undoubtedly 
a strong deterrent from suicide for people of faith. Nevertheless, the Islamist version of 
martyrdom could potentially help a suicidal woman circumvent this social taboo, all 
while maintaining religious devotion (Merari, 2010). Of course, this calls for killing 
others in the process, but if the Other has already been deemed an enemy of Islam, 
murder can be religiously justified. For a woman who is desperate, humiliated, 
stigmatized, and is in fact suicidal, martyrdom can be the ideal solution for her pain 
(Stern, 2003).  
Of course, the acute altruistic suicide concept applies to male suicide bombers as 
well. But as mentioned previously, men are more apt to be initially motivated by religious 
and nationalistic reasons, and as such it appears that men are more likely to reach the 
decision to become a suicide bomber without requiring a fatalistic suicidal component 
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(Bloom, 2011; Jacques & Taylor, 2008). In contrast, many females may indeed require 
the fatalistic suicidal piece in order to contemplate acute altruistic suicide along their path 
to self-sacrifice. 
 
PATHWAY II:  
PROBLEMATIZING FEMALE SUICIDE BOMBER MOTIVATIONS 
 
 
In Pathway I, I explored the typical narrative of an FSB, but in this second section 
I argue that the richer story is the complexity of those women who do not necessarily fit 
that mold. The motivations of women to become suicide bombers vary greatly from 
country to country and across cultures. No root cause or single overarching motivating 
factor can explain why women become FSBs, but rather it appears to be a myriad of 
intersecting factors (Bloom, 2011; Davis, 2013; Lankford, 2014; Speckhard 2008). 
Individual motivations are difficult to confirm empirically, and the rarity of FSB case 
studies makes disentangling those factors even more challenging. Moreover, the social, 
political, and religious factors cannot readily be separated from each other, especially in 
more conservative or Muslim societies.  
The intricacies of why some women would make a decision so significant as to 
enact a suicide bombing are always complex and interwoven with historical building 
blocks of events and reasons. FSBs are motivated, for example, by political grievances, a 
desire for revenge, psychological issues, personal trauma, fusion and loyalty to their 
communities, along with countless other reasons. Additionally, these events come at 
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different times in life for each woman. But the common factor is that each event and 
reason builds on the others until eventually the woman passes her threshold and chooses 
to carry out a suicide attack. 
As previously noted, FSBs’ motives are highly linked to personal reasons. But, 
while personal and individual motives are significant, they are not created in a vacuum. 
As Gentry and Sjoberg (2015) explain, “The ‘why’ might be rooted in the individual 
mindset, but this mindset is inextricably related to life experiences within complex 
gendered, raced, classed and religious contexts” (p. 47). In other words, FSBs may be 
motivated by personal reasons to carry out an attack, but social group beliefs, religious 
values, and collective identity all play an essential role in shaping and building on those 
personal reasons.  
However, the personal element is not always primary. This is not to say that the 
reasons presented in Pathway I are not present in Pathway II, only that other elements are 
introduced so the path may not be created in the same order. The myriad motives are all 
related, with their own histories attached. Throughout the woman’s life, these motives are 
created at various points and are interchangeably stacked, and inextricably connected, 
creating a unique path to suicide terrorism for each individual. But there comes a point 
when the culmination of all these motivating factors becomes too overwhelming, and one 
final event or reason serves as the trigger that catapults her into the mindset that leads to 
the decision to commit a suicide attack.  In the section that follows are some of the most 
common reasons found to underlie FSBs acts of terrorism.  
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Political 
Pape and Feldman (2010) claim that military occupation is the main driving force 
behind suicide terrorism. But Merari (2010) believes the political grievances theory is 
overstated. Consider, too, the question raised by Gambetta (2005), that, if someone were 
only politically motivated to commit terrorist acts, why would that person sacrifice his or 
her life to kill a few infidels: “why not just leave a parcel bomb and leave”? (p. 295).  But 
according to Jacques and Taylor (2008), “Even women whose motivation for 
participation includes an ideological element are often found to hold dualistic personal 
and ideological motivations, rather than pure religious or nationalistic motives” (p. 308). 
Given the political climate in which many of these FSBs have lived most of their lives, it 
would be a mistake to believe that politics has not shaped these women in similar ways as 
men. It should not be difficult to comprehend the anger that women would harbor 
resulting from occupations and conflicts. As Gentry and Sjoberg (2015) note, “Often 
female self-martyrs have been characterized as ‘driven by emotions’, which denies that 
women in the Middle East have legitimate political grievances for which they commit 
violence” (p. 54). Again, these multifaceted and interconnected motivations demand that 
we evaluate all aspects of FSBs’ lives in order to fully appreciate the reasons that activate 
their actions. After all, note Gentry and Sjoberg (2015), in the case of Palestinian 
bombers, one cannot “separate a woman’s life and choice to be violent from a 60-year-
old war” (p. 47).  
Personal Revenge 
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Personal revenge is another commonly cited motive behind female suicidal 
missions (Atran, 2010; Bloom, 2011; MacDonald, 1992; Merari, 2010). Merari (2010) 
claims that actions caused by this type of motivation are usually individual acts carried 
out shortly after the perpetrator has suffered a significant loss, such as the death of a 
father, brother, or son. And while male suicide bombers rarely target individuals, FSBs 
are five times more likely to target specific people (Atran, 2010). Women also seem to 
have different moral reasoning than men. Speckhard (2008) argues, “They are more 
easily motivated to revenge when loyalties as mothers, wives, and family members are 
violently disrupted” (p. 1016). This aligns with many accounts that claim personal 
reasons are the impetus for female terrorism (Bloom, 2005; Norozhna & Knight, 2016). 
Bloom (2005) elaborates: “When men conduct suicide missions, they are motivated by 
religious or nationalist fanaticism, whereas women appear more often motivated by very 
personal reasons” (p. 145).   
 
Psychological 
Much of the literature from terrorism studies shows that suicide bombers are 
psychologically “normal,” but that term can prove problematic (Dean, 2014; Merari, 
2010). It could simply be interpreted as non-sociopathic. Nonetheless, as Victoroff (2005) 
illustrates, “sociopaths may sometimes be among the terrorists, but terrorists are not, by 
virtue of their political violence, necessarily sociopaths” (p. 14). Although some could 
interpret “normal” as indicating the absence of all mental illnesses, even that 
understanding is problematic, because mental illnesses, especially varieties such as 
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depression, can be difficult to identify at first blush. Regardless, it has often been noted 
that terrorist recruiters are taught to screen out the mentally ill (Bongar et al., 2014; 
Sheehan, 2014). But lacking fairly thorough psychological training, a recruiter just 
looking “for guys that seem sad” is too unreliable an observation for making a successful 
claim for their screening processes (Bongar et al, 2014; Sheehan, 2014).  
Some scholars argue that a suicide mission could possibly be empowering to 
women attackers, definitively taking control of their lives and ultimately their deaths 
(Bloom, 2011; Narozhna & Knight, 2016). Along the same lines, family members of 
mainstream, non-terrorist individuals who have committed suicide often make peace with 
the idea that their loved ones died on their own terms, thus perhaps empowering 
themselves in a world that otherwise left them powerless (Post et al., 2014, p. 139; 
Rosofsky, 2009). It appears that FSBs could be effecting a similar act, empowering 
themselves in an oppressive world.  
 
Recruitment 
 
Motivation to join a terrorist group or to agree to a suicide mission can be 
facilitated by a woman’s feelings of increased vulnerability and lowered resistance, 
especially when she already feels she has no other opportunities available. Pedahzur 
(2005), Bloom (2005), and Sheehan (2014) claim that “enlistment officers” have 
recognized these women as ideal candidates for suicide missions and thus actively seek to 
recruit them. During her numerous interviews with terrorists, Stern (2003) observed, 
“hopelessness, deprivation, envy, and humiliation make death, and paradise, seem more 
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appealing” (p. 38). So, recruiters take advantage of such women’s personal distress, 
offering them a way to overcome their humiliation, a solution to their problems, and 
sometimes financial rewards for their families for their becoming suicide bombers 
(Moghadam, 2008; Pape, 2005).  
While some women are indeed recruited for suicide missions due to their 
vulnerability, they are actually more likely than men to be proactive in their recruitment. 
Jacques and Taylor (2008) report, “specifically, the more personally focused means of 
recruitment (e.g., proactive) are primarily associated with females, whereas recruitment 
driven by social and religious factors occurs more frequently for males” (p. 316). In other 
words, FSBs are more likely to personally seek out groups to join than wait to be 
recruited by them (Jacques & Taylor, 2008). However, while they do make the decision 
to participate in the mission, the details of where and when are often not up to them, but 
to the organization that supplies the bomb and the logistics (Bloom, 2005; Merari, 2010). 
And because many would-be female suicide bombers are not actively involved in terrorist 
groups, they will personally seek out fighters, usually through the connections of a male 
relative, for supplies and will request assistance in training and in formulating the attack.  
 
Post Facto Rationalizations 
 
Another factor to consider when assessing motivations is that failed FSBs are 
likely to have plenty of reasons to conceal their true motivations for participating once 
apprehended, thus making the researcher’s job more difficult. After a failed suicide 
bombing attempt, when the perpetrator is captured by the Other, there is a strong 
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incentive for women to claim they were coerced in hopes that they will be given 
sentencing leniency. But by claiming a political motivation to her own community that 
may support suicide bombings, the potential stigma on the FSB’s family from her failure 
could also be reduced (Merari, 2010; Speckhard, 2014). The families could be seen as 
producing a patriot that failed instead of a downtrodden daughter with no future. These 
plausible rationalizations, along with information gathered from post facto family 
interviews in the wake of successful attacks, helps to shed light on the difficulties 
inherent in trying to acquire accurate empirical reports; we always have good reason to 
believe that reports will be contaminated in such cases. 
 
Summary 
In a typical female path to martyrdom, such as outlined previously in Pathway I, a 
young woman is raised in conflict and then experiences personal trauma that leads to a 
blocked life. But, other possibilities could include the same reasons in a different order or 
a completely different set of reasons altogether. We cannot, for instance, discount that 
fact that there are females who are politically motivated with no personal stake, but who 
still join a group and become locally fused before carrying out an attack. In this section of 
Pathway II, I have outlined a second, more complex path to female martyrdom, in which 
the underlying factors overlap and are intrinsically connected, working together to form 
individual and complicated motivations. 
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DEVOTED “ACTRESSES”: A NEW FUSION 
 
DAT is useful for understanding some of the dynamics that explain extreme self-
sacrifice. However, I argue that the process and links between sacred values, identity 
fusion, and self-sacrifice is under-stressed and inadequately clarified. That is, the theory 
does not specify the conditions under which a fused individual will be motivated to 
commit an act of extreme self-sacrifice, such as a suicide bombing. Furthermore, DAT 
fails to account for possible gender difference. By employing the more nuanced view of 
FSBs that has been developed over the course of this paper, I hope to expand the current 
understanding of DAT by integrating several under-emphasized factors, including 
childhood political socialization in intractable conflict areas and sex differences in fusion 
processes. What we are left with a two-part amendment to the theory. 
 
Childhood Political Socialization in Intractable Conflict Areas 
I argue that childhood political socialization is a missing key element that can 
help clarify how extended fusion in DAT is generated. Political socialization illuminates 
how extended fusion can occur, and though it can reveal why Americans fight for the 
symbol of their flag, it is also vital for understanding why and how suicide bombers are 
often fused from childhood. In other words, childhood political socialization can create 
the extended fusion element of DAT, but where and how that socialization occurs is an 
important part of understanding the different ways in which it manifests. 
Most of the regions where female suicide bombers have most commonly 
attacked—the Middle East, Sri Lanka, and Chechnya—are all areas that have been 
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entrenched in political conflict or occupation for decades (Bloom, 2011; CPOST, 2016). 
Bar-Tal et al. (2016) suggest that when children are raised in intractable conflict, it can 
have “lasting effects on the solidification of children’s later socio-psychological 
repertoire” (p. 415). That is to say, through repeated exposure and intense experiences, 
the conflict is “inseparable from their daily lives” and thus normalized (Bar-Tal et al., 
2016, p. 415). Notably, political socialization begins earlier for children raised in 
occupied or war-torn areas, usually through “conflict-supporting narratives” conveyed by 
their authority figures—parents, teachers, older peers, and siblings—thus effectively 
reinforcing “systematic and coherent systems of belief, attitudes, and emotions that 
support the conflict” from a very young age (Bar-Tal et al., 2016, p. 417). Additionally, 
they are directly exposed to military weapons in public, checkpoints, subjugation, 
bombings, and may have experienced the loss of a family member or possibly their home 
through violence. Ultimately then, the collective memory of the conflict, stories about 
heroic warriors’ self-sacrifice, and beliefs that dehumanize the Other are ingrained into 
their developing socio-cognitive development.  
To understand how these collective belief systems are solidified, Thayer and 
Hudson (2010) suggest, “humans may bond with larger units (e.g., a country), but that 
requires an extensive effort by the state (e.g., years of nationalistic education)” (p. 45). 
Not only do these children obtain knowledge from personal experience, but Jewish-Israeli 
children, for example, are being taught “conflict-related societal beliefs” in school 
textbooks as early as the first grade. Similarly, Palestinian textbooks tend to have anti-
Semitic themes that can resonate with children, creating a permanent impact on their 
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social development (Bar-Tal et al., 2016; Sheikh et al., 2016). With this in mind, 
empirical evidence gathered among individuals affected by the troubles in Northern 
Ireland and the Boston bombing suggest that this approach to understanding the role of 
conflict in fusion is plausible (Jong et al., 2015). 
To further illustrate the pervasiveness of inculcating messages in some conflict-
ridden regions, Palestinian territories, as well as parts of Sri Lanka, are brimming with 
“posters, portraits, videos and music that praise the martyrs” (Gentry & Sjoberg, 2015, p. 
54). Indeed, many photographs celebrating martyrs line the streets and adorn the walls of 
children’s bedrooms (Bloom, 2011; Gentry & Sjoberg, 2015, p. 54). By the same token, 
“in the fourth grade you have kids who are [for] Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine” and often dress in their favorite 
organization’s uniform style (Gentry & Sjoberg, 2015, p. 54). This is along the same lines 
of how many American athletes are admired and emulated (Bloom, 2011; Merari, 2010). 
Interestingly, Merari (2010) remarked how he observed college students in Boston 
wearing their favorite sports player’s jersey and cheering for their team, much in the 
same vein as kids in Palestine, rooting for their favorite terrorist group and idolizing 
martyrs instead of athletes.  
Circling back to the children in areas of conflict, according to Bar-Tal et al. 
(2016) “a conflict supporting narrative acquired at an early age is often also maintained 
during adulthood” (p. 421). In other words, these children’s attitudes and beliefs have 
lasting effects and are carried into maturity. Similarly, when referring to Palestinian and 
Pakistani terrorist recruits, Post (2007) acknowledges, “The socialization is occurring 
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largely within society, so that by the time volunteers enter the [terrorist] cell, they require 
very little indoctrination, only technical training” (p. 229). These beliefs from childhood 
socialization then become solidified as sacred values, especially when the element of 
martyrdom is added, and according to Atran and Ginges (2012), “when sacred values 
acquire supernatural association, they become conceptually immune to reasoned 
challenge and subject to self-monitoring, reducing possibilities for social defection; they 
also become attention-arresting and memorable, rendering them culturally contagious” 
(p. 857). This is to say that when this element of political socialization in intractable 
conflict is added, it is not difficult to understand why hardwired in-group/out-group 
beliefs systems, which can motivate humans to support war and despise the Other, are so 
prevalent in conflict-ridden regions.  
 
Sex Differences in Local vs. Extended Fusion 
Atran (2010) considers camaraderie and identity fusion to be significant 
motivators for suicide bombers. However, it appears that local fusion may be more 
applicable to men. Based on the majority of the female case studies reviewed, women do 
not show group cohesion to be a motivating factor as strongly as men do (Jacques & 
Taylor 2008). Besides, many female suicide bombers (FSBs) join terrorist groups only 
weeks before their suicide missions, a point that lends itself to a hypothesis that FSBs 
may be aligned to their community by extended fusion than local fusion. This reasoning 
is consistent with the notion that many FSBs could possibly be fused with their extended 
community long before their terrorist activities were set in motion (Bar-Tal et al., 2016). 
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Post et al.’s (2014) description is similar when they write, “If it is true that children enter 
the path of terrorism and martyrdom early, by the time they are late adolescents they have 
been exposed to the bitter gruel of hatred and the requirement for revenge, extolling the 
value of martyrdom for, in some cases, upwards of fifteen years” (p. 139). So, it is easy to 
see how FSBs would be fused to their community, sharing sacred values and belief 
systems that subjugate the Other, for most of their lives. Accordingly, Zahedzadeh (2015) 
notes, “Suicide terrorism plays a greater role in ethnic conflicts when the perpetuators 
and victims belong to different groups” (p. 3). These conflict-supporting narratives that 
dehumanize the Other only add to an already turbulent situation.  
Admittedly, this explanation for extended fusion is applicable to both males and 
females. But, the idea that camaraderie with a local group is a strong motive for suicide 
bombers appears to be more relevant to men. Thus, if women do not show the same 
propensity for local group cohesion, it suggests that other factors play a role in their 
motivation. 
It is important to note that motivations for suicide bombers are always complex 
and rarely based on a single factor. A case in point, according to Atran (2016), is that 
“Case studies of suicide terrorism and related forms of violent extremism suggest that 
‘people almost never kill and die [just] for the Cause, but for each other: their group … 
their brotherhood, fatherland, motherland, homeland’” (as cited in Atran, 2010, p. 33). 
Indeed, FSBs also commit their suicidal attacks for a cause or for their homeland, but I 
argue that a missing motivating element that many females take action for is themselves. 
Research shows that FSBs do in fact kill and die for their group, in addition to many 
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other reasons that will be explored in Pathway II, but personal motivations are a more 
salient factor for women (Bloom, 2011).  
A strong body of evidence suggests that FSBs are motivated, and thus may fuse 
differently, than men (Jacques & Taylor, 2008). Local identity fusion explains how 
people can be radicalized and self-sacrifice for their group. In support of this theory, 
studies show that men are motivated more by nationalistic and religious causes, but in 
contrast, women are usually motivated by more personal reasons (Bloom, 2011). For 
example, Jacques and Taylor (2008) claim, “Male motivations are more likely to be 
found in group membership” (p. 308). Men may in fact have personal circumstances that 
contribute to their motivation to commit a suicide attack as well, but studies suggest that 
they are not as strong a motivator for men as they are for women (Bloom, 2011; Speckard 
2008).  
Even though studies have shown that FSBs are driven by personal reasons, some 
scholars have been reluctant to focus on the individual characteristics of suicide bombers, 
especially of the vast array of personality types and reasons why one looks to become a 
terrorist, and instead focus on group strategies as a way to combat terrorism (Post, 2007). 
Along the same lines, Atran (2010) reveals, “they’re [terrorists] not different enough 
from everyone else in the population to make them remarkable” (p. 277). However, it 
seems negligent not to pay attention to the catalyst that “makes them want to die and kill” 
(Atran, 2010, p. 277). 
Despite the evidence showing the differences between males and females, the 
literature of DAT does not explicitly distinguish gender differences in the motivations for 
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self-sacrifice, which reveals a serious theoretical underspecification. As Jacques and 
Taylor (2008) emphasize in their analysis of the different motivations between male and 
female suicide bombers, “by including gender as a variable in the analysis, it is possible 
to account for more variance in the data and encapsulate the complexities of the social 
and organizational dynamics of terrorist groups” (p. 320). By not clearly including a 
variable for females in DAT, the explanatory authority that the theory holds in explaining 
reasons behind extreme self-sacrifice is limited. 
In addition, DAT falls short in explaining the process of how fused individuals 
subsequently makes the decision to self-sacrifice. The data on devoted actors shows that 
not all devoted actors take this extra step to extreme sacrifice. I propose to remedy this 
issue by examining and introducing the socio-psychological motivations of FSBs into 
DAT. While females are indeed influenced to self-sacrifice by their extended group’s 
belief systems and ideology in addition to personal reasons, I argue that many women 
need an extra step in order to make the leap from extended fusion to self-sacrifice. That 
additional step is a fatalisticؘ–acute altruistic suicidal ideation brought on by personal 
traumatic circumstances in their lives.  
  By focusing on male self-sacrificing actors, the theory overlooks the importance 
of, and possible differences between, males and females. Although FSBs are a small 
minority of the self-sacrificing devoted actors, it is essential to provide a broader 
understanding of the gender variances that motivate individuals to self-sacrifice, 
particularly given the differences in motivation for FSBs described above. DAT, like 
many other theories that attempt to justify why some individuals would be willing to die 
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for their group, relies on evolutionary approaches to fictive kin. However, I believe they 
fall into a logical trap noted by Gentry and Sjoberg (2015), who state that “evolutionary 
theory often carries with [it] assumptions about men’s behavior as men, and are applied 
to women without analysis of the invisibility of women and femininity in their causal 
tales of violence” (p. 136).  Ultimately, my goal is to attempt to provide nuance by 
adding a female assessment—addressing the gender-based differences described above—
that I argue is necessary for DAT to be complete.  
 
Devoted Actor Theory Re-imagined 
 
DAT is a theoretical framework that provides a strong foundation of social and 
psychological explanations for how and why “devoted actors” are willing to self-sacrifice 
on behalf of a group. These actors’ personal identities are fused with a group, either one 
with direct relational ties (local), or projected, indirect relational ties (extended). In 
addition to sacrificing for the group, the devoted actor is protecting and willing to die for 
sacred values that are also embedded in the collective identity (Atran, 2016; Atran & 
Ginges, 2012; Ginges and Atran, 2013; Sheikh et al., 2014). According to the theory, 
group members usually have shared negative experiences that help cement a bond 
between the individuals and the group. This fusion then causes the individuals to view the 
group as they would themselves, and thus are willing to make costly sacrifices. In 
addition, Whitehouse (in press) points out that an outside threat to the group is what may 
trigger some individuals to self-sacrifice.  
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But I argue that this falls short in explaining how or why a select few decide to 
commit this act while majority of the group members do not. I therefore re-imagine DAT 
with a two part amendment.  
Amended Theory Part I 
 
To establish a more comprehensive approach to DAT that addresses the points 
highlighted above, I now provide a sequential explanation of how many typical FSBs 
evolve from being politically socialized in childhood to ultimately self-sacrificing as 
adults. I maintain that it provides useful insights and additions to DAT. 
To begin, FSBs are typically politically socialized as children during intractable 
conflicts, which can lead to extended fusion with their religious or nationalistic 
community. Subsequently, sometimes even years later, they experience a personal 
trauma, such as rape, that facilitates fatalistic suicidal ideations. In turn, this can evolve 
into acute altruistic suicidal ideations based on their aforementioned extended fusion. It is 
at this point that an outside threat is perceived towards her fused group. This catalyst 
activates a desire to bring her suicidal ideations to fruition, and she seeks out a sponsor 
from a locally fused group within the larger, extended group to assist with logistics and 
materials to then commit the self-sacrifice. 
The first step in the amended theory notes that many suicide bombers are 
politically socialized from childhood in areas where intractable conflicts persist and that 
both males and females begin the progression to becoming a devoted actor from a similar 
approach. They share life-changing and transformative experiences with their extended 
socio-cultural or religious groups, with whom they already share a collective identity that 
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will continue thorough adulthood. Because of the occupations and conflict, many of these 
experiences are negative, a trait in which has been demonstrated to enhance identity 
fusion in large groups (Jong et al., 2015). Then, this fusion allows for perceived “bonds 
of kinship” to be projected onto their group—regardless of personal relationships with 
other members, and thus results in the person becoming extendedly fused (Whitehouse, in 
press).  
At the same time, many self-sacrificing terrorists may arrive from countries that 
are unoccupied or without conflict. However, the fact that an individual did not grow up 
within an active conflict zone does not mean that they cannot identify with a group that is 
associated with an active conflict zone. An individual can be influenced by a perceived 
injustice to their extended religious, national, or cultural group without them being 
directly or personally affected. Regardless of the individual’s origin, I maintain that 
political socialization is an essential part to understanding extended fusion.  
Current research usually considers local fusion to be the more salient of the two 
types of identity fusion and theorists emphasize that the local group is the one that group 
members are willing to die for (Whitehouse, in press). Yet, at least for most suicide 
bombers who hail from regions rife with intractable conflict, childhood political 
socialization would suggest that their beliefs systems and collective identity are 
imbedded beginning in early childhood. Thus, this creates a basis for extended fusion 
before an individual forms the relationships that will lead to fusion with a smaller group. 
To elaborate this a bit further; the undercurrent of extended fusion that flows beneath 
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many cases of local fusion could be just as powerful an impetus for an individual to 
engage in a self-sacrificing endeavor.  
It is then, after childhood political socialization, where I propose that male and 
female suicide bombers start to deviate from each other. As previously noted, males are 
more likely to join or become locally fused to a small group. They may join with friends 
or alone, but I argue that for those from regions of intractable conflict, males may take 
their childhood socialized ideas and beliefs into the localized group. This is the point 
where many males form acute altruistic suicidal ideations, to become a religious martyr 
for political or nationalistic causes, to fight for the group while knowing he will be 
rewarded for his sacrifice in the afterlife. Finally, these steps lead to logistical plans with 
his group that culminate in a suicide attack. 
Similar to males, in adulthood, females may still have their long-held shared 
socialized beliefs and attitudes about conflict. But unlike most males, women are 
motivated to self-sacrifice more by personal reasons, are less associated with religious 
and nationalistic motivations, and are also less motivated by local group cohesion than 
men. Because of this, I suggest that it takes an additional—deeply personal—trigger to 
activate their path toward acute altruistic suicidal ideations that ultimately results in a 
suicide attack. This trigger is often a personal trauma. For example, it can be the loss of a 
family member to conflict, which could create a desire for vengeance. More often, 
though, the little information we have on the background of FSBs suggests that it comes 
in the form of an event that results in a “blocked future,” such as a rape, divorce, 
infertility, or a forced marriage.  
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These women’s lives can be hopeless, stigmatized, and the trauma of these events 
can eventually incite fatalistic suicidal ideations. Critically, suicide is typically forbidden 
by the religious and cultural traditions of most FSBs. And because they may still hold 
their socialized belief systems, they would not wish to deviate from these cultural or 
religious prescriptions. Therefore, a woman might develop acute altruistic suicidal 
ideations—through martyrdom—as a way to redeem herself, rid her family of shame, and 
contribute something to the cause of her extended group. In addition, the afterlife beliefs 
of such groups can also play a confirming role in her choice. Committing an act of 
martyrdom would not only enact revenge on a group that she blames for atrocities against 
her own group but killing to die will also provide her with an escape route from this life 
by promising eternity in paradise.  
 
Amended Theory Part II 
However, that is the typical narrative of FSBs, whereas there are many paths to 
self-sacrifice, as humans are complex, emotional beings who make most decisions for 
multifarious reasons. Another approach to understanding self-sacrifice within DAT we 
must consider all factors of motivation, not just the averages. For example, scholars often 
disagree on the primary causal reasons for FSBs’ actions; political, personal, or religious 
are the chief explanations that are typically put forth. However, employing a one-
dimensional understanding of these women’s reasons for participating in suicide 
bombings may be so reductive to the complexity of the matter that it misses critical issues 
concerning the interconnection of causal forces. By focusing on female’s personal 
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motives as her only reason for violence, for example, strips her of her agency to commit 
political violence, and the political climate in which most of these bombings occur 
suggests that political motives could often be a factor. I argue that a reframing of DAT 
allows us to remedy this issue by making room for women, by showing both the typical 
path towards self-sacrifice an FSB takes but also highlighting another path involving 
myriad interconnected, if not interdependent, intersecting reasons behind the motivations 
of FSBs.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Although the motivations mobilizing a small minority of suicide bombers, when 
there are much larger groups of terrorists, may seem trivial, it is in fact crucial in terms of 
today’s concern with terrorism. Instead of directing most of our resources on methods to 
stop suicide terrorism, we should focus more on how it starts.  
Suicide bombing is a vicious, murderous, messy, and violent act that seems to be 
overshadowed by the benign language often used in academia to describe these acts. 
Although I concede that I have followed suit here, the term self-sacrifice does not convey 
the brutality or ramifications of which we are discussing, and thus it allows us to become 
desensitized and get lost in the minutiae. Perhaps changing the terminology in survey-
based studies from “self-sacrifice” to “suicide explosion” and depicting the specifics and 
providing photographs of an actual suicide attack might produce results that are quite 
different. 
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In any event, studying self-sacrificing actors is no easy task. There are obvious 
limitations, including the dangerous and unstable regions where one would find such 
individuals, funding and ethical concerns for academics, and physical safety concerns, 
especially for women. The restrictions for academics can be detrimental, and thus may 
lead to fewer vital academic publications. This, in turn, can allow for journalists to lead 
the way in terrorism research because they face far fewer restrictions on research than 
those of the academy. And even if the reasons listed above did not pose an obstacle, it is 
quite difficult to collect sufficient data on enough of these actors for a quality study. This 
is also assuming that they would be willing and truthful participants. Many researchers 
have broken through for interviews, but much of the evidence obtained has been 
anecdotal.  
 Despite these types of obstacles, START has created the database, Profiles of 
Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS) (2016), that has gathered data on 
nearly two thousand radicalized individuals, such as marital status, work history, and 
radicalization ideologies. A global expansion of this type of database is precisely what is 
needed to adequately study and create suicide bomber profiles and psychological 
autopsies in order to better understand the mind of a suicide bomber, which typical 
cognitive styles are associated, and how they help shape the lives of women who would 
possibly become suicide bombers. It is with this information that we can then begin to 
figure how to counteract these attacks, possibly without the use of violence. Once we 
know why something starts, we are in a better position to understand how to compel it to 
end. This could lead to a more thorough understanding of the lives that suicide bombers 
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lead and could assist with developing more strategic defense systems and profiling tactics 
that could hopefully take suicide bombings off our list of global concerns. 
Ultimately though, we must be more cognizant of women’s global rights. It is 
possible that we could eliminate some potential FSBs by giving all women the freedom to 
walk away from an unfulfilling or dangerous life, or to be able to achieve dreams and 
aspirations for herself. But, unfortunately, merely giving women rights will not topple the 
patriarchy, the reason for why many of the oppressive conditions for women persist. 
However, perhaps in time, enough women will be empowered enough to be able to break 
through this ancient social system in order to claim their rightfully earned equal footing 
in the world. 
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